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Abstract: 
 
The recent financial crisis has further emphasised the precarious political situation of 
unions; austerity measures have targeted unions’ traditional institutional ally, the welfare 
state, as well as its last organisation stronghold, the public sector.  The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the how trade unions have responded to gaps in welfare provision, 
due either to reform or state negligence, and how state roll-back provides a silver lining 
via the enhancement of unions’ bargaining responsibilities.  We argue that apart from 
retrenchment and privatisation, there is a third road to welfare reform which envisages 
unions’ ‘collectivisation’ of social risks through take-up of marginalised policies in 
bargaining agreements. Presenting evidence from a most-likely (the Netherlands) and 
least-likely (Greece) case, we identify instances where unions have acted as pivotal 
political substitutes to the state in the realm of welfare provision.   
 
Key Words: Trade Unions, Welfare State, Welfare Reform, the Netherlands, Greece  
 
I. Introduction 
 
                                                
1 This paper is a spin-off from joint work that the authors conducted during their involvement in the 
Reconciling Work and Welfare (RECWOWE) network of excellence.  We wish to thank Christa van 
Wijnbergen, Anke Hassel, Richard Hyman and, in particular, Waltraud Schelkle for comments on other 
manuscripts on the topic. 
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The decline of union power over the past 30 years has been well documented. In 
many OECD countries, unions suffered significant loses in membership: the result of the 
changing structure of employment and the transition to the services economy, 
government policies, the retreat of collectivist ideals, pressures from globalisation and 
technological change.  In the US and UK, political attacks on unions in the 1980s were 
devastating, especially for union organisation within the private sector.  Even in 
Germany, bargaining coverage has slowly ebbed as (small and medium sized) employers 
began to doubt the usefulness of traditional institutions of corporatism (Siliva, 1997).  
 
The recent financial crisis has further emphasised the precarious political situation of 
unions; while major financial actors received considerable assistance from governments 
across the developed world, austerity measures have targeted unions’ traditional 
institutional ally, the welfare state, as well as its last organisation stronghold, the public 
sector.  Welfare state retrenchment is not new to the current fiscal/financial crisis; it has 
been on the political agenda of many OECD governments in the 1980s, and the extent of 
its rollback has been contested (see Pierson, 2001, Bonoli, 2007 and Hacker, 2004).   The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the how trade unions have responded to gaps in 
welfare provision, due either to reform or state negligence, and how state roll-back 
provides a silver lining via the enhancement of unions’ bargaining responsibilities.  
 
We further develop the argument, which we also make elsewhere (Johnston et al, 
2011), that apart from retrenchment and privatisation, there is a third road to welfare 
reform which envisages the ‘collectivisation’ of social risks as a response to retrenchment 
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pressures.  Additionally, collectivisation may take other forms, such as the protection of 
precarious workers via collective bargaining re-regulation (see Cella, this issue). We 
focus on how trade unions respond to the threat of welfare retrenchment, and whether 
they can successfully assume provision responsibilities over policies that have been shed 
or marginalised by the state.  If unions prove to be successful in such uptake endeavors, 
thus acting as ‘swords of justice’, they may eventually become pivotal political 
substitutes to the state in the realm of welfare provision.  Contrary to some who perceive 
unions as political dinosaurs and a relic of the industrial era, we present case study 
evidence that unions have successfully used instances of welfare state gaps to expand 
their competencies into new policy domains.  Union involvement in welfare provision is 
not entirely novel, but their managerial capacity to introduce additional layers of 
collective welfare provision in the face of reform has been undeveloped.  By presenting 
evidence drawn from, not only, a most-likely case, the Netherlands (where unions 
reintroduced disability insurance supplements in response to replacement rate cuts), but 
also, a least-likely case, Greece (where unions responded to the gap in vocational training 
through the creation of a national, solidaristic training fund), we argue that trade unions 
from heterogeneous corporatist cultures have achieved similar collectivist outcomes, 
albeit through different employment policies.   Nonetheless, despite an initial positive 
track-record, the preservation of such efforts throughout the current fiscal crisis has 
strongly diverged across our case studies.  While Dutch unions have expanded their 
provision of disability insurance supplements to over 90% of the total labor force, Greek 
unions have become victims of their own success, with the New Democracy government 
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assuming control over the collective training fund and using it to address budgetary (and 
clientelistic) pressures.       
 
Section II examines the historical relationship between trade unions and the welfare 
state. It outlines the links between the two institutions, explaining in what ways the 
welfare state has acted as a historical ‘institutional ally’ of trade unions.  Section III 
considers how welfare state retrenchment in the past 30 years has impacted this 
political/institutional relationship.  We identify a gap within the literature, already 
highlighted by Trampusch (2007a, b), that has ignored a possible route taken by unions to 
mitigate retrenchment while simultaneously enhancing their bargaining remit: the 
collectivisation of social risks. Section IV thus presents brief examples of collectivisation 
amidst welfare retrenchment. The cases stem from very diverse institutional contexts, 
highlighting the possibility that social risk collectivisation can extend beyond the 
traditional consensus-corporatist character of northwestern Europe.  In section V, we 
briefly discuss how these cases of collectivisation evolved during the crisis, and in the 
final section we consider the opportunities for ‘collectivisation’ of social risks in the 
context of a global financial crisis. 
 
II. Trade Union Involvement in the Welfare State 
 
The role of trade unions as welfare providers harkens back to their inception. Early 
craft unions (see Visser, this issue) started as workers’ self-help organisations to cater to 
sickness and old-age problems. Unions were not only a spontaneous expression of 
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solidarity among workers, but also a response to the gap of state or employer coverage 
for important social risks. Indeed, from their early days, unions offered ‘forms of life 
insurance or assistance with funeral costs as these have always been of concern to 
working people’ (Simms and Charlwood, 2010:141).  Throughout many Western 
European countries, trade unions either provided important welfare policies directly or 
became increasingly involved in their administration during the welfare state’s golden 
age.  
 
Taking 19th century Britain as a point of departure, the state was largely negligent in 
the provision of welfare for its citizens. In the ‘night-watchman state’ of the time, the role 
of government was limited to ensuring law and order. The dominant liberal paradigm 
accepted the idea that the poor were ‘intrinsically lazy’ (Spencer, 2009) and responsible 
for their own misery. Welfare provision was limited to voluntary philanthropy or the 
minimal coverage of British ‘Poor Laws’.  However, the dominant libertarian ideal of the 
19th century was challenged by the diffusion of socialist ideas. Workers’ organisations of 
the early 20th century managed to improve workers’ conditions in different respects: 
reducing daily working time, rules for health and safety; healthcare coverage for 
workplace accidents, negotiating sickness leave, etc. Still, the entitlement to these 
rudimentary ‘welfare benefits’ was linked to employment, rather than citizenship. The 
birth of Britain’s universalistic welfare state would have to wait until after the end of the 
Second World War.  
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The most prominent conceptualisation of the link between citizenship and social rights 
has been articulated by T. H. Marshall, in his magisterial work on Citizenship and Social 
Class. Marshall (1950:10-11) elaborated on the development of citizenship into three 
stages: (i) civil rights (e.g. property rights) linked with institutions such as the courts; (ii) 
political rights (e.g. right to vote) linked with institutions such as the parliament; and (iii) 
social rights linked with institutions such as the welfare state. Admittedly, his 
classification drew inspiration from the British case, and consequently such a linear 
development in the attribution of citizenship rights may not be observed in other 
countries. Nevertheless, Marshall highlighted that citizenship is incomplete unless all 
three rights are fully conferred to an individual. Thus, the boundaries between the 
individual as employee and the individual as citizen gradually blurred, and the welfare 
state became ‘the link between the situation of workers as employees and as citizens’ 
(Hyman, 2004:415). 
Throughout post-war Britain, and the resulting erection of welfare state institutions, the 
functional areas that social protection encompassed covered a wide range of risks that 
emerge throughout individuals’ life-cycle stages, not limited to employment, such as: 
education/training; healthcare; unemployment benefits; housing and family; and 
pensions. In this context, the relationship between welfare state and trade unions became 
more straightforward, and found a clear manifestation in ‘the varying extent to which the 
industrial relations actors (or ‘social partners’) are implicated in the administration of the 
welfare state’ (Hyman, 2004:416). Table 1 presents these life stages and links them to the 
corresponding welfare state policies which have seen, time after time, active trade union 
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participation in their provision. The rest of the section considers additional examples in 
alternative national contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Life-cycle states and welfare state/trade union domain 
Life-cycle Stage  Welfare State  
Policy Area 
Example of Trade 
Unions’ involvement 
Transition to first job –
education and skill formation 
Education and training 
policy 
Dual apprenticeship 
training system 
Break from employment due 
to risk of sickness/ disability 
Healthcare policy and 
social care 
Disability Benefits 
system administered by 
bi-partite boards 
Breaks from employment due 
to risk of dismissal 
Employment policy / 
unemployment benefits  
 
Ghent System of 
unemployment 
insurance 
Transition to independent 
household with/without 
family formation 
Housing policy and 
Work-Family balance 
policies 
Swedish Quality of 
Working Life  movement 
Transition from employment 
to retirement 
Pensions/social security 
policy 
Union pension funds/ 
Supplementary pension 
schemes 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
 
Education and Training 
 
The paradigm example for trade unions’ involvement in education and training policy is 
German unions’ engagement in the supervision of the dual apprenticeship system. The 
German system of training has been elevated as a role-model for many other countries 
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given the breadth and depth of skills that it confers onto workers. Full apprenticeships 
last for three years and trainees are taught technical skills both in the classroom and at the 
workplace through participation in various problem-solving activities (Grugulis, 
2009:121). Sectoral trade unions are involved in the design of the training programmes 
and the content of the curriculum.  This contributes to the production of a collective 
good, the acquisition of specific skills, across the industry, benefiting smaller and larger 
firms alike. However, several scholars have argued that ‘the much admired German 
apprenticeship system is not a system which can easily be transplanted to another 
economy’ (Soskice, 1993:102) since it is anchored on a set of specific institutional 
arrangements, of which the industrial relations system is but one. 
 
Employment and Unemployment 
 
Although the Ghent system of unemployment insurance took its name from the city 
located in the Flemish region of Belgium, it became synonymous with Nordic unions’ 
direct involvement in the welfare state. In short, it entailed the formalisation of a system 
of pre-existing networks of unemployment compensation organised by trade unions, 
which the government chose to subsidise. Hence, unemployment benefits were 
administered by trade union benefits, but funded by the state. Unions’ involvement in the 
direct administration of welfare benefits provided them considerable power, influencing 
their capacity to recruit members. Several scholars (e.g. Rothstein, 1992) have associated 
the existence of Ghent systems of unemployment insurance in Nordic countries with the 
persistence of high union density rates, and the capacity of such rates to withstand 
9 
 
modern political and economic pressures which have instead led to declining membership 
numbers in other countries. 
 
Pensions and Social Security Policy 
 
Union involvement in pension policy can take many forms, for instance unions’ 
administration of pension funds or supplementary/occupational pension funds. However, 
if unions use this policy strategically, they may also enhance their ability to retain 
membership from segments of the labour-force which have become inactive through 
retirement.  The Italian trade union movement, comprised by a large number of 
pensioners, provides a case in point.  Italian unions, like some of their Nordic counter-
parts, are heavily involved in the administration of pensions.  Baccaro and Locke 
(1996:3) noted that ‘the great majority of pensions (85 percent) [were] paid by the Istituto 
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS)’. At the same time the INPS was 
administered in a corporatist manner, and unions held ‘the majority in the board of 
directors of INPS’ (Regini and Regalia, 1997:215). Admittedly, the influence of Italian 
unions has waned since the 1990s. Nonetheless, unions are still involved in the 
administration of pension funds especially in countries with Bismarckian pension 
systems. 
 
In sum, trade unions have been historically involved in various facets of the welfare state. 
However, with advancement of neoliberal policies and the pressures for retrenchment in 
the post-industrial era, reform pressures were bound to challenge unions’ roles. The next 
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section considers how the relationship between trade unions and the welfare state evolved 
in the ‘era of permanent fiscal austerity’. 
 
III. Trade Unions and the Welfare State in the Era of Fiscal Austerity  
In the past 20 years, an overwhelming body of literature has discussed the new 
politics of welfare retrenchment.  Increased capital mobility, globalisation, the growing 
attraction of neoliberal and monetarist policies, slow growth and high unemployment 
prompted many to question the welfare state’s generosity.  Welfare states were criticised 
for their inefficiencies, but also for being a source of waste of public resources once 
system abuse gave way to ‘dependencies’ on entitlements (Cox, 2001).  The growing 
appeal of these critiques to political parties and policy makers led them to place fiscal 
austerity measures high on political agendas. 
Several scholars, however, remained sceptical about the true extent of welfare 
retrenchment.  Pierson (2001) questioned the radicalism of welfare state retrenchment, 
and was among the first to outline new politics behind welfare state reform.  Pierson 
reasoned that unlike welfare state build-up, which involved enactment of popular policies 
in a relatively under-developed interest group environment, welfare state retrenchment 
requires the pursuit of unpopular policies that must pass scrutiny of voters and well-
entrenched interest groups. Because these veto players would more willingly block 
welfare retrenchment than welfare expansion, major (unpopular) cutbacks in the welfare 
state are highly unlikely, and may be limited even in periods of budgetary crisis. 
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While many criticised Pierson’s scepticism over the scope of welfare 
retrenchment (see Clayton and Pontusson, 1998 and Scruggs and Allan, 2004), Hacker 
(2004) offered a unique critique to Pierson’s ‘new politics’ argument.  He acknowledged 
that while many US social programmes resisted radical retrenchment, less visible changes 
to the US welfare state have taken place, which prompted the increased privatisation of 
social risks.  These crucial changes to the welfare state do not result from highly-
publicised or large-scale legislative reform, but from more silent initiatives of 
decentralisation, the prevention of welfare policies’ adaptation to modern pressures or the 
erection of new institutions on top of old ones.  These processes are just as threatening to 
the welfare state, as they force individuals to privatise risks and instruments of income-
support which were formally within the remit of the collective sphere. 
 Although both Hacker and Pierson offer innovative insights with reference to the 
scope of welfare retrenchment since the 1980s, both largely ignore the role played by 
trade unions in this largely political process.  The lack of attention towards industrial 
actors is perhaps justifiable in the American context, where trade unions have witnessed 
severe erosion in their political power and have, historically, lacked any role in welfare 
provision.  In the European debate, little consensus has emerged on the role of unions and 
employers in welfare retrenchment as reform blockers or reform enhancers: Cox (2001) 
and Scruggs and Allan, 2004 classify unions as the former, while Ebbinghaus and Hassel 
(2000) and Rhodes (2001) identify these agents as the latter.  Nevertheless, both the 
American and European debates on welfare reform neglect possible ‘blowback’ as 
surprisingly little analysis focuses on policy provision after retrenchment reforms are 
enacted. 
12 
 
As we have argued elsewhere (Johnston et al 2011) ‘collectivisation of social 
risks’ is an overseen alternative, in which unions, with or without employers, may fill 
gaps created by welfare state retrenchment by shifting polices into the sphere of 
collective bargaining.  Turning Hacker’s privatisation argument on its head, we argue 
that, if unions are successful in policy up-take, reform can lead to a re-collectivisation 
(where welfare provision enters a collective sphere of influence) rather than the 
privatisation (where welfare provision enters an individual sphere of influence) of risk.  
The possibility of collectivisation is not entirely novel and has been discussed in great 
length by Trampusch (2007a, b) who outlined how social partners in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, France, and to a lesser extent Germany have utilised solidaristic approaches for 
the distribution of welfare provisions in the areas of pensions, early retirement and 
training.  She argues that as concepts of solidarity encompass a structural dimension, 
unions will utilise such concepts as a moral principle underlying the application of 
welfare schemes (2007b: 202).  We diverge from Trampusch, however, in one crucial 
respect: we present cases of collectivisation which have involved clear cases of 
competency transfer from the state to social partners after welfare retrenchment or 
negligence.  In other words, rather than examining welfare policies where social partners 
held clear competencies before the age of welfare retrenchment, as Trampusch does, we 
explore whether state roll-back/negligence has led to unions successfully expanding their 
bargaining competencies.  
The examination of this distinctive form of collectivisation is important for two 
reasons.  First, it suggests that unlike the caricature of ‘selfish insiders’, unions may cater 
the interests of outsiders in their attempts to safeguard the welfare state.  The argument is 
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all the more significant as welfare retrenchment usually takes place ‘in the name of 
outsiders’.  These constituencies may fall by the wayside as a consequence of extensive 
welfare state slimming.  Unions’ attempts at collectivisation can therefore provide the 
means to extend social protection to marginalised groups.  Second, the hypothesis 
suggests that welfare state retrenchment can provide a silver lining for unions in terms of 
revitalisation. As globalisation and international competitiveness place further constraints 
on the wage realm of bargaining, unions can use welfare state reform as an opportunity to 
re-assert their bargaining legitimacy over new, non-wage issues.  By doing so, they can 
shift the boundary of social policy provision from the public to the collective sphere.  
The next section considers briefly two case studies, in which unions and 
employers successfully managed to ‘collectivise’ welfare provision by shifting it into the 
collective bargaining sphere. These cases represent different facets of welfare state 
policy-areas (training and disability) in diverse industrial relations contexts. Thus, the 
cases serve to illustrate that collectivisation can be generalised at a greater level of 
abstraction, because diverse trade union traditions and cultures produced similar 
outcomes, albeit in different policy domains.   
IV. Collectivisation of Social Risks in the Age of Fiscal Austerity 
 
Trade Unions and Training: The Solidarity Fund in Greece 
 
The industrial relation system in Greece has been characterised by an embedded 
adversarial culture and a lack of tradition of social partnership along West European 
norms. It was therefore a remarkable achievement for this institutional setting that trade 
unions and employers agreed to establish a fund for the financing of vocational training 
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programmes in the late 1980s. The breakthrough came with the national collective 
bargaining agreement signed in 1988; unions and employers agreed to establish a general 
levy to all employers, 0.20% of the total wage bill, to finance vocational training 
programmes (Demetriades, 2002). 
 
A few years later, the national collective bargaining agreement of 1994 increased 
the employer levy (0.45% of total wage bill). The levy would be collected in a Fund 
(ELPEKE) which was administered by a state agency, Manpower Organisation. Firms 
which offered training programmes to their employees were able to claim reimbursement 
of their costs from ELPEKE. Even more surprisingly, in the 1994 national collective 
agreement the peak labour confederation (GSEE) and peak employers associations (SEV, 
GSEVE, ESEE) agreed to establish a second Fund (EKLA) with sole purpose to finance 
training programmes for unemployed. Importantly, the resources for this fund came to a 
larger extent from the employers than from employees (0.26% and 0.10% of the total 
wage bill respectively). The two Funds were supervised strictly by a bi-partite committee, 
in which there was equal representation of unions and employers and the president of the 
Manpower Organisation chaired the meetings. In 1996 the two Funds were subsequently 
merged to a single one (LAEK), which came to be known as the ‘Social Solidarity Fund’. 
 
Overall, trade unions and employers agreed a clear redistribution of resources 
from their own members to ‘outsiders’ of the labour market. Admittedly, training is a 
policy-area conducive to positive-sum and consensual outcomes, since both firms and 
workers benefit from skills provision. Firms would invest in human capital, with the 
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expectation of accruing benefits of higher productivity in the long run. However, the 
collectivisation of social risks is more surprising when the reach of the solidarity was 
extended to cover unemployed. This was a clear example of unions assuming a social 
policy area and collectivising one particular risk, lack of skills, from unemployment (for 
a more detailed account see Johnston et al., 2011). 
 
 
Trade Unions and Welfare: Disability Insurance in the Netherlands 
 
Dutch corporatism has often been classified as one of consensus, where unions 
routinely exchange wage moderation for working time reductions and policy concessions 
from employers and government, respectively.  Despite such cooperation, the Dutch state 
has historically played an active role in wage management when such consensus has 
stalled, threatening to legislatively impose wage freezes in line with policy/economic 
objectives (Hemerijck and Marx, 2006).  While this form of temporary unilateralism has 
facilitated the continued delivery of wage moderation, in the case of disability insurance 
reform, it created a unique window of opportunity for Dutch social partners to assume a 
pivotal role in benefit distribution. 
    
Reform of disability insurance (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, 
WAO), consistently evaded Dutch governments throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Several (successful) reforms were implemented reduce the replacement rate of disability 
insurance in the late 1980s, yet the social insurance programme continued to burden 
public finance due in large part to claimant volume – an estimated 1 million by 1990 
(Hemerijck 2003). Social partners were partially to blame for WAO abuse as disability 
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benefit was administered by bi-partite Insurance Industry Associations (IIAs), and 
employers’ reliance upon the welfare programme to shed older workers made it an 
effective tool to avoid the costlier process of dismissal. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Lubbers-Kok coalition overcame the disability reform 
deadlock and unilaterally introduced new reform measures in 1993 which tightened 
eligibility criteria and further reduced WAO benefits for younger workers.  While 
government unilateralism through legislation was not novel to Dutch employment policy, 
unions’ response to the reforms in subsequent collective bargaining rounds was 
unprecedented.  ‘WAO repair’ became the top bargaining priority of Dutch unions, 
preceding even pay, in the 1993 and 1994 bargaining agendas.  In order to rectify the 
reduction in benefits for workers under 59, unions pushed for ‘WAO supplements’ in 
company and sectoral agreements.  For sectoral agreements, unions managed to secure 
WAO supplement contributions from employers.  Top-up provisions, financed mostly by 
employees, were secured in bargaining settlements within the construction, 
metalworking, banking, and post and telecoms sectors.  WAO repair even occurred in the 
public sector; in the 1993 civil servants’ collective agreement, unions secured a voluntary 
employee-funded scheme and this was extended, reluctantly, by the Minister of Social 
Affair to the rest of the sector via extension law (for a more detailed account see Johnston 
et al., 2011).  
 
Borrowing Crouch’s (2000) terminology, Dutch unions’ collective offensive 
against Lubbers’ unilateral WAO reform provides a clear example of social partners 
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transforming the snakes of welfare retrenchment into ladders.  What is more remarkable 
about this competency transfer in WAO financing is that it occurred in a period after 
significant union political and organisational decline (Hemerijck, 1995).  After the 1980s, 
where the persistent exertion of wage moderation had become a policy norm, the WAO 
‘top-up’ offensive provided a crucial opportunity for Dutch unions to demonstrate their 
bargaining legitimacy in non-wage issues that could provide positive-sum gains for 
labour.  Unions’ success in rectifying Government’s plans for retrenchment was apparent 
even one year after reform implementation.  A 1994 report from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs indicated that most collective agreements concluded in 1993 and early 1994 had 
provided full ‘WAO repair’ (EIRR, 1995).  While these supplements were financed 
mostly by employees, unions avoided the marginalisation of disability insurance by 
shifting (partial) WAO financing into the collective sphere. 
 
 
V. The Dutch and Greek Cases in the current Crisis 
 
 
 Contrary to their convergent collectivisation trends in social policy during the 
1990s, the Dutch and Greek cases exhibit strikingly divergent paths with respect to their 
sustainability in the aftermath of 2007 and the ensuing financial and fiscal crisis.  For 
Dutch unions, WAO repair in the 1993 and 1994 bargaining rounds represented the tip of 
the iceberg of a collectivization wave.  Evidence from Yerkes and Tijdens (2010) on 
FNV collective agreements indicates that WAO inclusion in collective agreements 
increased substantially throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  Between 1995 and 2000, 
collectively agreed first/second year WAO benefit supplements, FNV and CNV’s early 
‘WAO repair’ coverage initiatives, rose from 50/50 percent to 74/60 percent in the public 
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sector and 3.4/2.6 percent to 49.3/40.1 percent in the private sector (Yerkes and Tijdens, 
2010: 378).  By 2009, first and second year income supplements were included in 99 
percent of private sector collective agreements and 97 percent of public agreements.  
Only ten years after Dutch unions’ original collectivisation efforts, the share of (private-
sector) collective agreements that provided second-year WAO benefits top-ups which 
pushed the total replacement ratio above government’s pre-reform 70 percent level 
increased from 2.6 percent to 56.7 percent (378).  By 2006, this number rose to a 
staggering 74 percent.   
 
Such numbers have not declined in the face of the current fiscal crisis.  By 2009, 
the 73.7 percent of (private-sector) collective agreements provided the (above) 70 percent 
top-up supplement, on par with pre-crisis coverage levels (Yerkes and Tijdens, 2010: 
378).  Coverage of supplementary income to state disability insurance within the 
first/second year of claims marginally increased between 2007 and 2009, from 95.4/93.8 
percent to 97.1/97.1 percent of public sector agreements and from 97.8/97 percent to 
99.5/99 percent of private sector agreements.  Coverage ratios of collectively agreed 
WAO income supplements do not significantly diverge between sectoral and company 
level agreements.  By 2009, 98.1 percent of industry agreements provided first and 
second year supplements, while 99.5 percent and 98.9 percent of company agreements 
provided first and second year supplements, respectively.  Since 2005, company 
collective agreements had greater coverage of the more generous second-year ‘above 70 
percent’ supplements than sectoral agreements (Yerkes and Tijdens, 2010: 379).  
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For Greek unions instead, the debt crisis represented an important setback. As the 
reserves of the Fund accumulated during the 2000s, they attracted the attention of the 
cash-starved New Democracy government. In the face of a collapse in tax revenues and 
soaring public expenditures, the government sought to tap the social partners’ fund, 
scrapping their autonomy. In 2007, an unauthorised transfer of funds from the social 
partners’ training account (LAEK) to the government’s unemployment accounts took 
place (OAED). The peak labour confederation, GSEE, pressed charges against OAED 
and the employers’ confederation (SEV) requested an extraordinary financial audit, but 
these requests were in vain. In early 2009, all the reserves of the Fund were completely 
transferred to Manpower Organisation accounts and by mid-2009, as the (hidden) budget 
deficit was ballooning, the government employed the bipartite Funds to finance anything 
but training, spanning from clientelistic recruiting in the civil service to subsidies for 
farmers, thus leading to a public outcry from unions and employers. 
 
The divergent exposure of countries to this fiscal crisis may help explain the 
variation in recent trends.  As the Dutch have enjoyed a more stable fiscal position than 
the Greeks, desperate fiscal and political measures have not been necessary in the 
Netherlands. Yet, despite the different debt positions, one should not ignore the possible 
contribution of heterogeneous trade union cultures to the longevity of unions’ capacity to 
act as ‘swords of justice’ (Flanders, 1970) in times of crisis.  The Dutch state has 
frequently intervened in wage bargaining in the past, yet very rarely has it permanently 
removed bi-partite responsibilities from social partners.  FNV and CNV’s success in 
shifting WAO provision so significantly into collective agreements may render this 
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policy area a permanent non-wage issue under collective management - highly difficult 
for the state to eventually fully reclaim.  
 
VI. Conclusion: Prospects for Collectivisation in times of Crisis 
 
Although Pierson (2001) established the commencement  of ‘the era of permanent 
austerity’ in the 1980s, governments across Europe today are confronted with 
significantly intensified pressures to reduce public spending and consolidate budgets.  
The emergence of a global negative fiscal shock which stems from the recent, and 
ongoing, financial and fiscal crises therefore heightens the likelihood of direct or indirect 
welfare state retrenchment.  Increasing female workers’ retirement age in Italy, shedding 
public sector employees in Ireland, and tightening the stringency of welfare entitlements 
in the UK are just a few examples of the more recent measures introduced by Western 
European governments to approximate balanced fiscal budgets and ultimately restore the 
‘confidence’ of financial markets. 
 
In the face of such heightened pressures, the role that may be played by trade 
unions as ‘swords of justice’ in the management of the welfare state becomes ever more 
relevant. Unions may not only embrace their traditional roles in employment 
management, but also participate in the reallocation and redistribution of public finances 
under stress, albeit indirectly. Unions, with or without the support of employers, could 
function as a political substitute for a financially-pressed state by bringing onto 
themselves, and the workers they represent, the costs of welfare provision, thereby 
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reviving their ability to offer ‘forms of life insurance or assistance’ (Simms and 
Charlwood, 2010:141).  The socialisation of risks witnessed in the Netherlands and 
Greece, which preceded the heightened pressures we observe today, represent but a 
starting point for this virtuous cycle to commence. 
 
Yet, one should not expect the collectivisation of social risks as a direct 
consequence to fiscal austerity everywhere and every time.  Moreover, one also should 
not assume that instances of collectivisation will ultimately survive fiscal crises.  Though 
the Dutch and Greek cases of collectivisation were solidified during the economically 
tremulous early-1990s, the remainder of the decade, as well as the early 2000s, provided 
an economic environment which could foster the growth, or at least maintenance, of 
collective financing.  Europe’s present fiscal crisis, on the other hand, offers a more 
strenuous test for collectivisation’s endurance.  With states under incredible pressure to 
pursue austerity, social partners may be required to assume a greater role in the provision 
of welfare as the scale of retrenchment becomes more severe.  Alternatively, if debt 
positions become unmanageable, desperate governments may attempt to capture 
collective resources that social partners have successfully wrestled from the state.  Such 
conditions may better gauge the true success of collectivisation, as they enable one to 
distinguish permanent union inroads into collectivisation from temporary ones. 
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